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Abstract 
 
 
This article analyzes the contribution of technology-intensive activities to the 
increase in aggregate labor productivity in the industrial sector for a set of 28 
countries, dividing 150 industrial classes into four groups based on their 
degree of technology content (High, Medium-High, Medium-Low and Low). 
After decomposing the evolution of labor productivity with a statistical 
method, it was found that these activities did not contribute significantly to 
the increase in the efficiency indicator. These exercises also corroborate the 
absence of a global structural change in industry that would drive levels of 
aggregate labor productivity. 
 
JEL Classification: L16; O14; L60. 
Keywords: Industry. Structural Change. Productivity. Technology Change. 
Economic Development. 
 
 
Resumen 
 
El presente artículo analiza, para 28 países, la contribución de las actividades 
tecnológicamente intensivas al incremento de la productividad laboral 
agregada del sector industrial, separando 150 clases industriales en cuatro 
grupos en función de su contenido en tecnología (Alta, Media Alta, Media 
Baja y Baja). Tras aplicar una técnica estadística de descomposición de la 
evolución de la productividad laboral, se encuentra que no existe un aporte 
significativo de estas actividades al aumento del indicador de eficiencia. Los 
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ejercicios efectuados permiten también corroborar la ausencia de un cambio 
estructural global en la industria propulsor de los niveles de productividad 
laboral agregados. 
 
Clasificación JEL: L16; O14; L60. 
Palabras Clave: Industria. Cambio estructural. Productividad. Cambio 
tecnológico. Desarrollo Económico. 
 
Introduction 
 
Historically, ample literature has maintained the need for a structural change 
to revitalize productivity levels as a prerequisite for economic growth and 
development. Both the orthodox perspective and various heterodox 
approaches have promoted the practicality of directing available resources 
towards more efficient uses through transformations in the sectoral 
composition of the economy. From one point of view, neoclassical axioms 
defend the capacity of the market to efficiently allocate resources to different 
uses and understand global economic liberalization as an opportunity to 
relocate productive factors and inputs to more profitable uses (Bhagwati, 
1988).  
 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) specifically emphasize the relevance of 
innovation, the deliberate result of investment in industrial research and 
development, as a growth factor, and ascertain that countries specialized in 
high-technology activities achieve higher productivity growth rates. Lucas 
(1988) goes even further in this argument, suggesting that public policy 
measures are essential in fostering structural changes to transform the 
productive specialization pattern in favor of technology-intensive sectors 
with better expectations for the terms of international exchange.  
 
Likewise, the structuralist approaches, such as the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) point of view, underline the 
importance of generating spillover effects, pecuniary and technological 
externalities and backward and forward linkages resulting from the structural 
change (Cimoli, 2005A). In the tradition of structural change models with an 
unlimited supply of labor, such as models by Lewis (1955), Jorgenson (1961) 
and Fei and Ranis (1961), Furtado (1963), also related to this school of 
thought, professes the need to transfer workers from more backward sectors, 
such as agriculture, to modern sectors (read: industry), as a first step to 
invigorate demand. This line of argument incorporates Keynesian principles, 
because the increase in productivity resulting from the change in employment 
composition leads to wage raises that diversify consumption and in turn 
transform the productive structure to become more efficient.  
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At the level of the industrial sector, a version of these reflections is related to 
the proposal to scale the productive specialization pattern towards activities 
with higher technology content, which would imply developing new 
industries with the consequent transfer of workers and capital to these 
industries. The basis for this type of analysis is varied, but in works by 
Hoffmann (1958) and Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986), this process 
consists of the displacement of light industries by heavy industries that are 
more technology-intensive and have higher labor productivity. The categories 
in articles by Chenery and Taylor (1968) and Syrquin (1988) are divided into 
early, middle and late industries, the latter of which are the most 
sophisticated and efficient. As Timmer and Szirmai (2000) summarized, this 
evolution is related to technological upgrading that produces a bonus for 
overall industrial labor productivity growth, as more advanced activities have 
a greater capacity to accumulate capital than traditional activities. 
 
More recently, in the Nelson and Pack (1999) model, the aggregate increase 
in productivity was also driven by a structural change consisting of the 
expansion of the modern sector using more efficient technologies and with 
higher profits, as compared to traditional activities. It is worth noticing, 
however, that in this evolutionary perspective, the existence of a superior 
technology does not automatically imply that it spreads to the rest of the 
structure (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). Neo-Schumpeterian principles also 
maintain that the introduction of a new technology paradigm (Dosi, 1982) 
causes leadership in productive development to shift from industries tied to 
older technologies towards more dynamic industries that exploit the new 
paradigm, which stimulates overall economic growth. 
 
Silva and Teixeira (2011) reached a similar conclusion by demonstrating the 
association between successful experiences of rapid growth and structural 
change in 21 countries (20 OECD countries plus Taiwan) in the time period 
1979-2003, calculating the Nickell and Lilien indices, based on data from the 
Groningen Growth and Development Center Industry Database, among other 
sources, for 56 branches under ISIC (International Standard Industrial 
Classification) Rev. 3. After estimating regressions using the panel data 
methodology, these authors found that countries with the fastest structural 
change benefited the most from a greater increase in the relative weight of 
human capital-intensive and innovation-intensive industries. Their results 
also indicated that these knowledge-based industries had a positive and 
significant impact on the increase in aggregate productivity, concluding that 
sectors associated with the production (but not consumption) of information 
and communication technologies are strategic for economic growth. 
 
In the SES (Schumpeterian, evolutionary and structuralist) synthesis 
currently promoted by ECLAC, in the context of the growth or creation of 
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specific new activities, innovation leads structural change, thereby giving rise 
to a virtuous growth cycle. From that perspective, the characteristics of 
knowledge intensive activities, their dynamism in international markets and 
the potential to increase productivity levels are the criteria to identify sectors 
that foster structural change (Peres and Primi, 2009). Rising employment and 
labor productivity are intimately tied to economic diversification, especially 
to the greater weight of high-technology activities in the manufacturing 
structure (Cimoli and Porcile, 2009). In fact, these authors measured 
structural change as the variation of the share of sectors involved in the 
"diffusion of knowledge" in the total value added of manufacturing and 
maintain that structural articulation, both at the micro and mesoeconomic 
level, is produced through the absorption of products and the improvement of 
productive processes with higher technology content (Cimoli, Porcile, Primi 
and Vergara, 2005).   
 
In this regard, the work compiled by Cimoli (2005B) draws on various 
studies to relate the persistence of within and between-sector industrial 
structural heterogeinity, and the low articulation of export activities with the 
rest of the productive system, with the absence of structural change processes 
that would bolster technology use in Latin America. Cimoli et al. (2005) 
calculated the variation of the participation of various knowledge-diffusing 
sectors in the total aggregate manufacturing value for the period 1970-2000 
in a group of 17 economies (seven in Latin America), using information from 
the ECLAC PADI database and the OECD Industrial Structural Analysis 
database. Their results indicate that the increase in this participation was 
hardly significant, rising from 21.2% to 28.3% for Latin American countries 
on average, while the coefficient fell for Argentina, Colombia, Peru and 
Uruguay. Broadly speaking, these authors document the absence of structural 
change in favor of these knowledge-diffusing sectors in the manufacturing 
apparatus in the region and the widening of the technology gap with respect 
to the United States and other emerging Asian economies, such as Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan.  
 
Based on a correlation matrix in which technology variables had relatively 
low coefficients with growth as compared to structural change, it is suggested 
that these variables act indirectly by transforming the productive structure. 
The article then cites findings from Holland and Porcile (2005), who used a 
shift-share technique and calculated the null contribution of structural 
change, referring to the transfer of employment towards more productive 
purposes (static effect) or increasingly productive purposes (dynamic effect) 
to the evolution of the industrial labor indicator in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay between 1970 and 2002, looking at data for 
28 sectors. In fact, in this Latin American study, the total increase in labor 
productivity for the unweighted average of the six countries had a negative 
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relationship (-0.5%) with the rate of industrial employment increase, while 
the efficiency indicator fell due to the dynamic transfer effect, from 0.6% in 
the 1970s to -4.7% in the 1990s. 
 
Along this line of thinking, Ocampo's vision (Ocampo, 2005 & 2011) seeks 
to integrate structuralist analysis with reflections on technological upgrading, 
in a balanced fashion. After indicating that various productive branches have 
different capacities to increase productivity, the author proposes the existence 
of two essential phenomena in productive development: "innovation" and 
"complementarities"
1
. The main externalities arise from their interaction. 
Despite maintaining the idea that an export pattern based on technology 
content is central, in keeping with other authors in this ECLAC school of 
thought, the author significantly recognizes that ‘when value chains 
disintegrate, the link between the technological content of export products 
and production activities may be broken, especially in the case of maquila. In 
these cases, and in export industries that use large volumes of imported 
inputs, the complementarities may also be very limited’ Ocampo (2011). 
 
In this regard, the elevated participation of sectors classified as high-
technology in the total added value of industry alone and without the 
consequent development of the necessary complementarities may not 
contribute to a structural change that would drive aggregate efficiency levels. 
Furthermore, the literature acknowledges that various branches have different 
capacities to increase productivity, basically due to the varying capital-labor 
ratios in each activity (Baumol, 1967). This implies that high-technology 
industries have a lower capacity to create jobs in proportion to their growth 
and, in the long term, the relative weight of these companies in the overall 
labor composition tends to be reduced, producing negative consequences, 
because there are no significant carry-over effects to the sectoral degrees of 
aggregate productivity. In this sense, Rada and von Armim (2012) point out 
that for the overall productive apparatus, the relative weight of the labor 
factor falls as compared to capital, brought on by the process of technological 
modernization.  
 
Based on that idea, Peneder (2003) hypothesized that there is a "structural 
burden," stating that the shift of workers from dynamic sectors to others with 
lower growth could negatively impact productivity. In fact, Peneder (2003) 
looked at data from 98 manufacturing categories for 16 European countries in 
the time period 1985-1998 using the Eurostat New Cronos database and 
confirmed that at the aggregate level, the effects of structural reallocation 
                                                          
1
 Ocampo (2005) offers an extensive definition of complementarities, referencing not only 
the role of backward and forward linkages, as described by Hirschman (1958), but also the 
role of public, private or mixed institutions created to reduce the costs of information. 
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have a lower impact on the evolution of sectoral labor productivity. The 
study also analyzed data from the United States, Japan and Canada and found 
evidence of a "structural burden," specifically by observing the expulsion of 
productive factors from dynamic industries with high growth in this 
indicator, a phenomenon robustly confirmed at a more disaggregated level 
for all European nations considered in the exercise, except Finland, Denmark 
and Great Britain. 
 
One significant finding was that after classifying the industries into 
taxonomies, capital-intensive branches composed of high-technology 
industries, with more skilled jobs and/or jobs requiring services based on 
knowledge that traditionally produce stronger productivity growth, showed 
signs of negative structural effects. In fact, in these cases, it was confirmed 
that the relative weight of labor was reduced with the consequent expulsion 
of employment towards other activities, simultaneous to the growth of 
production and productivity. The article also highlighted the pronounced and 
systematic differences between the sectors, derived from technology gaps 
that have a negative impact on potential positive externalities, an aspect that 
Holland and Porcile (2005) pointed out as part of the phenomenon of 
growing within-sector heterogeneity in Latin America. 
 
With regards to previously published literature, the main contribution of this 
work consists first of addressing the topic of structural change within 
manufacturing and on the most disaggregated level possible (four digits of 
the ISIC Rev. 3 classification for 150 activities) in a significant sample of 
countries with varying levels of development and geographic locations. 
Secondly, by decomposing the evolution of labor productivity with a shift-
share technique that is rather more complete than those generally used in this 
type of study, this work contemplates the issue from the perspective of the 
technology content of each activity, aiming to dispute the popular sentiment 
that the most modern industries are capable of driving structural 
transformation with considerable carry-over effects for the rest of the 
manufacturing apparatus. In this regard, the results found in this work point 
in the direction of the relevance of investigating the weight of national 
complementarities and degrees of modernization, and systemic efficiency of 
the economy in determining the aggregate levels of sectoral productivity. 
Likewise, other germane aspects, such as the correlation between the degree 
of diversification, the density of the productive structure, and efficiency 
indicators merit an in-depth study that can only be addressed making use of 
more complex econometric techniques. 
 
This work, therefore, aims first to confirm Peneder´s hypothesis in a group of 
28 countries with varying levels of development and geographic locations, 
and then, analyze the contribution of technology-intensive industries to 
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sectoral efficiency, dividing 150 activities into four groups based on their 
technology content (High (H), Medium-High (MH), Medium-Low (ML) and 
Low (L)), pursuant to the OECD classification (OECD, 2005).  
 
Do higher-technology activities contribute significantly to the growth of 
industrial labor productivity? If they do, is this contribution associated with a 
structural change (understood as the shift of workers from low-productivity 
uses to high-productivity uses)? 
 
After describing the theoretical principles involved in this work and 
reviewing the most relevant findings of prior empirical studies related to 
industrial structural change in various countries by way of introduction, the 
second section summarizes the methodologies used, as well as the source and 
periodicity of the data for each of the various exercises. The third section 
presents the data and studies the various labor productivity trends as a 
function of the technology content of activities in 28 countries. Finally, the 
fourth section reveals the results obtained from applying the shift-share 
technique to the contribution of the four groups of activities to the evolution 
of aggregate labor productivity and structural change in the sector, while the 
last section debates the theoretical considerations presented in the 
introduction. 
 
 
1. Methodology and Data 
 
For the methodology to decompose the evolution of labor productivity, we 
follow Roncolato and Kucera (2014) who borrowed their mathematics from 
prior works conducted by other authors. Aggregate labor productivity of the 
industrial sector was calculated by dividing total value added by the total 
number of employees, or q=X/L. For each of the industries i (or group of 
industries) that make up the sector, the indicator was then calculated as 
qi=xi/li and total aggregate labor productivity as: 
 
 
  
 
 
  
   
   
             (1) 
 
 
By taking into account first-order differences with respect to time (t=0), it 
turns out that the evolution of labor productivity can be expressed as: 
 
 
                         
  
  
                   (2) 
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The derivation of equation (2) is thus: 
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We find that: 
 
 
              
                   
                    
             
              
 
 
The evolution of labor productivity can now be decomposed into an intrinsic 
effect in contrast with the structural effects of labor reallocation. 
 
The intrinsic effect is the first term on the right side of equation (2), that is: 
 
 
                               (3) 
 
 
This intrinsic effect is the difference between growth in value added and the 
growth in employment weighted by the share of industry in the total value 
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added for the sector. It reflects the increases in labor productivity associated 
with changing efficiencies within each of the activities and can be associated 
with the phenomenon of technological and organizational progress. 
 
The interaction effect found here is represented by the quotient q1/q0 and 
translates into the difference between the growth in labor productivity and the 
sum of the intrinsic and structural effects of labor reallocation.  
 
Finally, the structural effect is part of the second term on the right side of 
equation (2), that is: 
 
 
                                (4) 
 
 
This factorial reallocation effect is the difference between the participation of 
value added and employment in the sectoral totals multiplied by the growth 
of employment in the industry in question. It reflects the contribution of the 
shift of workers towards industries with above-average productivity to the 
evolution of the aggregate labor productivity of the sector, in other words, the 
contribution of structural change to the behavior of the efficiency indicator. 
 
Broadly speaking, the contribution of each industry (or group of industries) to 
the variation in the aggregate labor productivity of the sector is the sum of the 
growth of labor productivity weighted by its share in the total value added 
(intrinsic effect) plus the increase in employment levels weighted by relative 
labor productivity (structural effect). Needless to say, the effects can be 
negative when factors shift towards less productive activities (structural 
effect); or when labor productivity decreases, due to technological 
obsolescence or regressive transformations in the organization, within 
different industries (intrinsic effect).  
 
In this article, labor productivity at the level of categories grouped by 
technology intensity was calculated using the sum of the values added of the 
various activities that make them up, divided by the sum of the number of 
employees in the activities, values that correspond to the four-digit activities 
in ISIC Rev. 3 with consistently available information. For the groups studied 
here, the effects and their relative contributions were determined by adding 
the previously calculated effects of the activities belonging to each group. 
Similarly, and to prevent inconsistencies, the effects for the sector total were 
equal to the sum of the effects of each group considered. 
 
It is notable that, as Roncolato and Kucera (2014) wrote, ‘…the larger the 
difference in labor productivity among sectors, the larger the potential 
Ensayos Revista de Economía 132 
increases in aggregate labor productivity through reallocation effects, 
provided employment shifts from less to more productive sectors.’ In this 
sense, we could expect that a high degree of structural heterogeneity, 
normally associated with rather less mature productive apparatuses, would 
have a positive correlation, particularly in developing countries, with the 
processes of structural change buoyed by the growing weight of technology-
intensive industries. 
 
In terms of information sources, after reviewing available resources, the 
choice was made to use the Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT) 4 2012 
database under the ISIC Revision 3 classification created by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), as it is the only 
source that standardizes the data obtained from various national industrial 
surveys for a significant number of countries (135) and activities (151). 
However, one issue with this source is that it does not have homogeneous 
time series for the entire set of activities and nations, so there are many gaps 
and inconsistencies. To resolve this problem for the exercises in this study, 
countries, time periods and activities were chosen based on the ability to 
obtain the most complete and consistent data series without producing any 
specific bias. 
 
With that said, countries with the most information available on the most 
disaggregated level possible were selected (four digits in the ISIC Rev. 3 
classification), aiming to achieve a relatively balanced geographic 
distribution and levels of development. Time periods were selected in each 
case by looking for the years with the most number of data entries, without 
any specific bias, using the average of each series as a reference. The data 
was then deflated to 2005 United States dollars, as this is a relatively stable 
international economic unit. The series used was the producer price index for 
all manufacturing industries published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of 
the United States Department of Labor (BLS, 2014).  
 
The only activities eliminated were those with no data for the first or last year 
of the period or those with very inconsistent behavior over time. As such, the 
time periods, number of years and activities considered in the exercise vary 
for each country, which in turn explains the presentation of some of the 
results in terms of the arithmetic rates of average annual growth in real 
prices, aiming to prevent imbalanced comparisons between cases. It should 
be noted, however, that the first and last years of the exercise were chosen for 
similar periods (between 1994 and 1998 for the first year and between 2005 
and 2009 for the last year), except for Morocco (2000-2009), due to the lack 
of information. 
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Finally, the activities were regrouped based on their technology intensity into 
four categories (high, medium-high, medium-low and low), following the 
taxonomy created by the OECD (2005).  
 
 
2. Labor Productivity by Groups of Technology Intensity in Selected 
Countries 
 
Before presenting the statistical information, it is necessary to offer a few 
additional clarifications as to the limitations of the methodology used. First, 
as various classic authors have pointed out (Baumol, 1967; Scherer, 1982), 
technology flows among different activities and investment in R+D can 
explain some of the evolution of aggregate sectoral productivity. Scherer 
(1982) asserted the relevance of R+D directed towards creating or improving 
products used as inputs in determining the growth of productivity in sectors 
that manufacture final goods. According to him: “This tendency is likely to 
be mirrored in the distribution of measured productivity growth as price 
deflators systematically underestimate the hedonic value of new products and 
hence undervalue the inputs used by an innovating industry´s customers” 
(Scherer, 1982: 627).  
 
Second, the regrouping of the activities into four categories of technology 
intensity pursuant to the OECD classification (and any other existing up to 
the present) does not allow us to distinguish the differences in capital 
intensity among the tasks effectively carried out in certain locations. In all 
sectors, tasks are carried out with differing factorial content and as a result, 
have different productivity levels.  In the context of marked productive 
specialization patterns, the most efficient activities are generally associated 
with transnational companies inserted in global value chains that relocate 
productive segments based on their factorial content, so the contribution to 
aggregate sectoral productivity of a single activity may differ significantly 
from one country to another. Likewise, we note the importance of the degree 
of modernization of a country's physical infrastructure as an additional 
explanation for the differences in efficiency detected among countries. In this 
way, in some cases, labor productivity may be higher in low technology 
intensity sectors.  
 
In this sense, and as a final clarification, the objective of this paper is not to 
question the relevance of R+D and innovation processes in general in 
determining productivity levels of aggregate sectoral productivity, but rather, 
on the contrary, to challenge the contribution, per se, sustained by abundant 
literature, of technology-intensive activities. As demonstrated by the results 
presented below, it will be necessary to conduct a detailed diagnosis of the 
contribution of the various industries in each specific national context in 
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connection with their levels and forms of articulation, both domestically and 
within global value chains. Although the methodological limitations do not 
permit a comprehensive approach to the topic of the role of the most 
"modern" industries in a potential structural change that would boost 
efficiency levels in the framework of developing the organization of 
international manufacturing, this is not considered to be a major obstacle in 
terms of the objectives set forth here. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present the participations of the four categories of activities 
grouped by technology intensity in the value added and total number of 
employees in the industrial sector for the 28 countries selected in the year 
2005. The data indicate that on average, high-technology industries represent 
11% of the sectoral value added, while the sum of the averages of the H and 
MH groups was 37%. On the country level, one initial observation is related 
to the apparent lack of a specific pattern for cases with a greater weight of 
activities of the first group in the total value added. In fact, nations where 
industries that are highly technology-intensive had a greater participation 
(Korea, Hungary and Finland), were of varied levels of development and 
different geographic locations.  
 
Even so, when looking at the sum of the contributions of the first two groups 
(H and MH), the traditional production powerhouses are at the top of the list 
(Germany, 56% and Japan, 53%), which might suggest that medium-high 
technology activities generate both monetary benefits and benefits in terms of 
productive development equivalent to or even greater than high-intensity 
activities. In the other hand, Latvia stood out among countries with 
productive structures that are very concentrated on low-technology 
industries, as nearly 70% of the value added considered was generated by 
these activities, while in Ecuador, the sum of the H and MH groups 
represented only 8% of the total and in Iran, activities with higher technology 
content only represented a very low 3%. 
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Table 1 
Participation of Groups of Activities by Technology Intensity in the 
Total Value Added of the Sector in Selected Countries, 2005 
(Percentages) 
 
Country    H   MH H+MH ML L Total 
Germany 13.17 42.58 55.75 23.07 21.18 100 
Austria 12.48 29.79 42.27 28.80 28.94 100 
Belgium 14.95 27.89 42.84 28.14 29.02 100 
Korea 24.30 30.44 54.74 27.07 18.18 100 
Denmark 21.20 22.20 43.39 23.48 33.13 100 
Ecuador 1.30 7.18 8.48 50.84 40.68 100 
Slovakia 6.97 26.39 33.36 40.77 25.87 100 
Spain 5.93 26.23 32.16 32.33 35.51 100 
United States 21.34 26.74 48.08 23.33 28.59 100 
Finland 23.82 22.96 46.78 20.28 32.94 100 
France 16.70 28.33 45.03 25.67 29.30 100 
Netherlands 7.95 24.03 31.98 31.30 36.72 100 
Hungary 23.73 36.57 60.30 15.25 24.45 100 
India 8.35 31.06 39.41 37.75 22.84 100 
Indonesia 7.47 27.43 34.90 12.99 52.11 100 
Iran 3.38 36.26 39.63 44.06 16.31 100 
Italy 9.16 27.39 36.55 30.81 32.64 100 
Japan 16.56 36.92 53.48 23.80 22.72 100 
Jordan 7.62 16.53 24.14 37.19 38.67 100 
Latvia 5.80 9.28 15.08 16.04 68.88 100 
Lebanon 1.12 18.67 19.79 27.41 52.80 100 
Morocco 5.90 18.31 24.20 26.90 48.90 100 
Mexico 7.29 32.23 39.52 26.19 34.29 100 
Norway 8.94 19.33 28.27 32.16 39.57 100 
Poland 5.92 21.20 27.13 33.76 39.12 100 
United 
Kingdom 
18.84 23.55 42.38 22.50 35.12 100 
Sweden 16.35 32.73 49.08 23.53 27.38 100 
Turkey 3.08 25.98 29.06 29.98 40.96 100 
Simple 
Average 
11.41 26.01 37.42 28.41 34.17 100 
Standard 
deviation 
7.15 7.95 12.59 8.49 11.53 0.00 
Coefficient of 
variation 
62.64 30.57 33.64 29.89 33.74 0.00 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
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Table 2 
Participation of Groups of Activities by Technology Intensity in the 
Total Employment of the Sector in Selected Countries, 2005 
(Percentages) 
 
Country  H MH H+MH ML L Total 
Germany 10.31 38.45 48.76 24.24 27.00 100 
Austria 9.43 26.71 36.14 27.54 36.32 100 
Belgium 9.21 25.25 34.46 27.86 37.68 100 
Korea 17.94 29.27 47.21 26.64 26.15 100 
Denmark 13.14 25.00 38.14 24.76 37.11 100 
Ecuador 2.05 9.67 11.72 15.91 72.37 100 
Slovakia 6.68 29.66 36.34 27.71 35.95 100 
Spain 4.72 22.23 26.95 31.20 41.85 100 
United States 14.27 24.16 38.43 26.23 35.34 100 
Finland 13.95 24.21 38.16 22.67 39.17 100 
France 12.59 25.74 38.33 26.51 35.16 100 
Netherlands 5.31 23.45 28.76 28.97 42.27 100 
Hungary 13.49 26.91 40.40 18.77 40.83 100 
India 5.74 20.59 26.32 22.91 50.76 100 
Indonesia 5.51 10.47 15.99 13.18 70.84 100 
Iran 4.37 29.27 33.64 33.91 32.45 100 
Italy 7.35 25.85 33.20 29.72 37.07 100 
Japan 12.19 31.15 43.35 23.36 33.29 100 
Jordan 4.67 11.70 16.37 28.46 55.18 100 
Latvia 3.06 9.46 12.52 13.50 73.97 100 
Lebanon 0.98 11.71 12.69 29.41 57.90 100 
Morocco 2.85 12.72 15.57 15.84 68.60 100 
Mexico 5.30 27.18 32.48 18.63 48.89 100 
Norway 6.78 16.97 23.74 30.16 46.09 100 
Poland 5.23 20.34 25.58 25.70 48.72 100 
United 
Kingdom 
12.92 23.45 36.37 25.10 38.53 100 
Sweden 8.91 32.57 41.48 24.16 34.35 100 
Turkey 1.96 17.99 19.95 24.76 55.29 100 
Simple 
Average 
7.89 22.58 30.47 24.56 44.97 100 
Standard 
deviation 
4.50 7.56 10.91 5.34 13.58 0.00 
Coefficient of 
variation 
57.03 33.48 35.82 21.74 30.19 0.00 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
In terms of the participation of the H and MH groups in the number of sector 
employees, the lower capacity of these activities to create jobs with respect to 
their productive capacity due to a higher capital-labor ratio was confirmed, as 
their average weight in the structure was only 8% and 23%, respectively. 
Once again, Korea saw the highest contribution of the first group to 
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employment and in Germany, the sum of H and MH accounted for nearly 
half of sectoral job positions. Another factor relatively unrelated to this 
article that may influence the behavior of the contributions of these groups to 
overall job creation and economic growth is the distribution of the activity 
income among benefits and wages and, consequently, on how rigid the labor 
legislation in each country is. In the Table 2 data, the role of low-technology 
activities in creating jobs in many developing countries which tend to be 
characterized by high levels of unemployment, such as Ecuador, Indonesia, 
Latvia and Morocco, was also worth noticing.  
 
Table 3 presents labor productivity levels by activity group in selected 
countries for 2005, and the results were significant. As expected, because 
technology-intensive activities are more modernized and technified, they had 
higher labor productivity. However, the difference between the averages of 
the countries for the various groups was not as significant as might be 
believed. Specifically, the efficiency indicator for the MH group was only 
3.3% higher than the figure for medium-low industries.  
 
It was also corroborated that cases with the highest labor productivity in the 
group H were in turn those with the highest levels of total aggregate 
productivity (United States, Japan, Korea and Belgium, with the exception of 
Finland). In parallel fashion, nations with the lowest total aggregate 
indicators (India, Indonesia, Latvia, Slovakia, Morocco and Jordan) had the 
lowest levels of this indicator in nearly all groups defined, which underlines 
the importance of how modern the physical infrastructure is and the existence 
of complementarities in determining the efficiency of the various activities, 
especially, in the overall productive sector.  
 
Table 3 
Labor Productivity by Groups of Technology Intensity in Selected 
Countries, 2005 (Current US Dollars) 
 
Country  H MH H+MH ML L Total 
Germany 94,724 82,179 84,833 70,627 58,189 74,195 
Austria 112,317 94,631 99,245 88,746 67,614 84,865 
Belgium 167,738 114,103 128,434 104,329 79,571 103,307 
Korea 155,796 119,538 133,313 116,836 79,959 114,972 
Denmark 127,664 70,249 90,025 75,039 70,631 79,118 
Ecuador 19,853 23,228 22,638 100,024 17,592 31,295 
Slovakia 13,245 11,300 11,658 18,684 9,136 12,698 
Spain 74,341 69,745 70,549 61,238 50,152 59,107 
United States 250,175 185,252 209,364 148,880 135,424 167,372 
Finland 157,271 87,360 112,917 82,407 77,461 92,113 
France 96,112 79,737 85,114 70,158 60,360 72,445 
Netherlands 125,767 85,965 93,310 90,633 72,866 83,892 
Hungary 44,140 34,089 37,445 20,383 15,018 25,085 
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India 13,444 13,952 13,841 15,233 4,161 9,246 
Indonesia 12,910 24,945 20,796 9,392 7,008 9,527 
Iran 17,089 27,430 26,086 28,766 11,126 22,141 
Italy 84,227 71,637 74,425 70,088 59,538 67,617 
Japan 168,815 147,283 153,341 126,611 84,819 124,283 
Jordan 24,814 21,510 22,453 19,891 10,667 15,221 
Latvia 20,480 10,600 13,015 12,845 10,068 10,812 
Lebanon 29,599 41,031 40,152 23,994 23,469 25,740 
Morocco 27,806 19,372 20,918 22,858 9,593 13,457 
Mexico 89,673 77,208 79,241 91,549 45,682 65,127 
Norway 127,938 110,468 115,453 103,381 83,231 96,959 
Poland 29,309 26,978 27,455 33,997 20,779 25,883 
United 
Kingdom 
115,781 79,760 92,558 71,185 72,403 79,427 
Sweden 152,240 83,379 98,175 80,812 66,142 82,975 
Turkey 29,343 27,019 27,248 22,652 13,857 18,706 
Simple 
Average 
85,093 65,712 71,571 63,616 47,018 59,557 
Standard 
deviation 
63,712 44,472 50,163 39,634 34,015 41,865 
Coefficient 
of variation 
75 68 70 62 72 70 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
As such, another relevant observation was the apparent positive correlation 
between sectoral levels of aggregate productivity and the weight of 
technology-intensive industries in the structure. In fact, countries with a 
higher overall labor indicator (United States, Japan and Korea) only partially 
match cases with a higher share of high-technology activities (Korea, 
Hungary and Finland), as well as those with the highest weight of the sum of 
the H and MH groups in the structure (Germany, Korea and Japan). In this 
regard, Figures 1 and 2 show these associations, respectively, for the 28 
countries analyzed. This first approximation confirms, although hardly in a 
robust fashion, what the previously reviewed literature indicates, that is, a 
positive correlation between the labor efficiency indicator and the weight of 
technology-intensive industries in the industrial structure, especially when 
considering only the group of high-technology activities (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 
 Industrial Labor Productivity and the Participation of High Technology 
Activities in the Structure of the Sector, 2005  
(Current US Dollars and Percentages) 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Industrial Labor Productivity and the Participation of High and 
Medium-High Technology Activities in the Structure of the Sector, 2005  
(Current US Dollars and Percentages) 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
 
Table 4 displays the annual average growth rates of labor productivity in real 
terms by groups of technology intensity for the countries selected. Once 
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again, the H group is the most dynamic, with an average increase of 7.1%. 
However, the ML group had a rate (6.3%) higher than the two other groups 
(MH (5.4%) and L (4%)). At first glance, it appears there is no correlation 
between the dynamism of the indicator and the technology content of the 
activities in this case. It is also notable that the cases with the strongest 
increases in aggregate labor productivity were all developing countries with 
high growth rate indicators in the set of groups (Indonesia, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Latvia and India). This is once again evidence for the systemic 
nature of the behavior of labor productivity in the industrial sector on the 
global level, as well as the greater potential for capital accumulation in 
developing countries. 
 
Table 4 
Real Annual Average Growth Rates of Industrial Labor Productivity by 
Groups of Technology Intensity in Selected Countries 
 (Percentages) 
 
Country  H MH H+MH ML L Total 
Germany 3.68 3.03 3.19 1.91 -0.14 2.08 
Austria 0.49 2.33 1.81 0.51 0.37 1.14 
Belgium 6.19 2.11 3.45 2.94 2.73 3.17 
Korea 7.12 6.50 6.91 3.79 4.90 6.26 
Denmark 4.24 3.30 3.71 3.07 2.57 3.42 
Ecuador 15.90 2.14 3.95 7.69 8.70 7.35 
Slovakia 21.11 15.07 16.10 15.51 11.74 15.08 
Spain 1.91 3.34 3.06 4.67 4.81 4.32 
United States 3.36 1.93 2.50 3.79 2.63 2.83 
Finland 11.47 1.33 5.10 1.95 -0.88 1.91 
France 2.96 2.42 2.61 2.81 3.70 3.09 
Netherlands -2.18 1.69 0.81 -0.52 -0.76 -0.21 
Hungary 7.29 14.97 12.15 10.82 13.26 14.17 
India 7.58 7.92 7.84 20.67 5.58 11.41 
Indonesia 17.88 24.42 23.21 25.95 19.67 22.41 
Iran 0.42 0.98 1.01 4.20 -0.80 2.72 
Italy 2.08 1.22 1.42 1.04 1.24 1.30 
Japan 2.33 0.89 1.29 0.25 -0.62 0.70 
Jordan 13.16 8.02 9.53 7.32 5.31 6.36 
Latvia 39.65 23.17 27.36 24.54 8.27 12.60 
Lebanon -3.03 -0.77 -0.87 -2.14 -0.11 -0.36 
Morocco 11.47 -1.51 0.45 9.85 4.28 5.20 
Mexico 4.63 4.48 4.51 9.01 3.63 5.15 
Norway 4.74 5.19 5.13 4.97 3.67 4.54 
Poland 7.29 12.83 11.52 9.06 6.96 9.00 
United 
Kingdom 
5.12 3.58 4.33 4.35 3.94 4.21 
Sweden 5.83 2.05 3.16 1.48 1.00 2.15 
Turkey -3.91 -2.42 -2.64 -1.92 -3.06 -2.48 
Simple 
Average 
7.10 5.36 5.81 6.34 4.02 5.34 
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Standard 
deviation 
8.75 6.80 6.87 7.37 4.93 5.50 
Coefficient of 
variation 
123.24 126.75 118.28 116.16 122.64 102.92 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
 
3. Results: Structural Change and Technology Intensity  
 
This section summarizes the results obtained from applying the methodology 
to decompose the evolution of labor productivity (total effect) into two 
components: an intrinsic effect associated with technological and 
organizational changes within each activity or activity group, and a structural 
change, understood as the contribution of the shift of workers between 
industries with different levels of efficiency (see methodology section). Table 
5 presents the contribution in percentage terms of the four groups of activities 
to the evolution of total aggregate productivity in industrial labor for the 28 
countries. 
 
Table 5 
Contribution to the Evolution of Industrial Labor Productivity by 
Groups of Technology Intensity in Selected Countries (Percentages) 
 
Country H MH H+MH ML L Total 
Germany 22.61 65.99 88.60 19.88 -8.49 100 
Austria 3.81 59.98 63.80 12.75 23.45 100 
Belgium 22.71 19.91 42.62 25.40 31.98 100 
Korea 22.47 28.47 50.94 16.38 32.68 100 
Denmark 19.37 21.49 40.86 20.25 38.89 100 
Ecuador 3.80 -1.62 2.18 73.80 24.02 100 
Slovakia 11.14 18.54 29.68 35.20 35.12 100 
Spain 3.56 23.02 26.58 31.10 42.32 100 
United States 18.28 17.23 35.50 29.15 35.35 100 
Finland 91.41 14.51 105.92 7.24 -13.16 100 
France 14.06 21.58 35.65 22.03 42.33 100 
Netherlands 68.20 -180.78 -112.58 69.62 142.96 100 
Hungary 12.52 37.95 50.47 11.00 38.53 100 
India 6.72 26.21 32.94 66.38 0.68 100 
Indonesia 5.73 31.76 37.50 13.94 48.56 100 
Iran -1.03 31.28 30.25 77.19 -7.44 100 
Italy 13.73 26.54 40.27 22.69 37.04 100 
Japan 32.48 32.74 65.22 9.42 25.36 100 
Jordan 22.94 29.61 52.54 59.17 -11.71 100 
Latvia 12.08 20.24 32.33 20.42 47.26 100 
Lebanon 12.44 -99.83 -87.39 190.16 -2.78 100 
Morocco 9.85 -5.15 4.70 43.25 52.04 100 
Mexico 5.95 27.33 33.28 35.44 31.28 100 
Norway 8.31 20.10 28.41 32.39 39.20 100 
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Poland 5.38 30.51 35.88 31.34 32.78 100 
United 
Kingdom 
16.59 21.11 37.69 26.42 35.88 100 
Sweden 45.40 29.02 74.42 11.38 14.20 100 
Turkey 4.78 -4.73 0.05 -11.66 111.60 100 
Simple 
Average 
18.40 12.96 31.37 35.78 32.86 100 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
The data overwhelmingly reveal that groups with low technology-intensive 
activities (ML and L) had a higher contribution to the sectoral efficiency 
indicator, as the average contribution of the ML group (35.8%) and the L 
group (32.9%) was much higher than the contribution of the H (18.4%) and 
MH (13%) groups. In fact, in both developing countries with the highest rates 
of increasing aggregate labor productivity, with the exception of Hungary, 
(Indonesia, Slovakia, Latvia and India), as well as in the United States, a 
nation whose indicator was the highest in the sample, the contribution of low 
technology-intensive groups was higher than that of high and medium-high 
groups. The few cases in which the contribution of the H and MH groups was 
higher than that of the ML and L groups were generally characterized by high 
levels of productive development. However, this group is still rather 
heterogeneous, including countries such as Hungary and Jordan. 
 
We are now able to answer the first of the questions proposed in the 
introduction; technology-intensive activities do not significantly contribute to 
the increase in the aggregate labor productivity of the sector. Broadly 
speaking, contrary to what the majority of works reviewed claim (Timmer 
and Szirmai, 2000; Silva and Teixeira, 2011), this result does not question the 
greater capacity of technology-intensive industries to accumulate capital and 
achieve higher levels of efficiency, but rather the degree of their contribution 
based on their theoretical importance to the aggregate industrial performance. 
This finding can be explained by the reduced weight of modern activities in 
the structure, both in terms of value added (Cimoli et al., 2005) and 
employment (Rada and von Armim, 2012), but as the result is verified 
although to varying degrees for countries with different levels of 
development. The hypothesis to prove in terms of the principal determinant 
of this result would then seem to be the scarce and unequal development of 
existing complementarities (Ocampo, 2011). 
 
On this order of ideas, Table 6 shows the contribution in percentage terms of 
the intrinsic, structural and interaction effects to the evolution of the labor 
productivity of the sector. Negative data means that the labor indicator fell in 
the period indicated as a result of the aforementioned concepts. Similarly, 
because the sum of the three effects adds up to 100%, data above this amount 
implies a contribution of more than the entire increase in aggregate labor 
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productivity whose value exceeds 100%, logically compensated by the 
negative contribution of the sum of the remaining two effects. Once again, 
the results were rather conclusive. On average, the structural and interaction 
effects were negative, while the intrinsic component explained more than the 
entirety of the increase observed in the efficiency indicator (114.5%).  
 
Table 6 
Determinants of the Evolution of Industrial Labor Productivity in 
Selected Countries (Percentages) 
 
Country 
Intrinsic 
Effect 
Structural 
Effect 
Interaction 
Effect 
Total 
Germany 125.22 -12.79 -12.43 100 
Austria 86.77 13.63 -0.39 100 
Belgium 83.90 7.60 8.50 100 
Korea 91.31 6.20 2.49 100 
Denmark 77.16 11.05 11.80 100 
Ecuador 129.54 18.48 -48.02 100 
Slovakia 109.62 -1.38 -8.24 100 
Spain 103.49 3.36 -6.85 100 
United States 76.07 3.83 20.09 100 
Finland 119.03 -12.23 -6.80 100 
France 79.31 2.84 17.85 100 
Netherlands 105.71 -9.32 3.61 100 
Hungary 92.50 9.90 -2.39 100 
India 126.87 0.51 -27.38 100 
Indonesia 106.26 6.38 -12.64 100 
Iran 84.45 52.23 -36.68 100 
Italy 90.83 5.87 3.29 100 
Japan 54.25 26.51 19.24 100 
Jordan 254.46 -48.34 -106.12 100 
Latvia 107.03 1.19 -8.22 100 
Lebanon 347.76 -248.16 0.40 100 
Morocco 107.84 -5.81 -2.02 100 
Mexico 90.51 0.52 8.97 100 
Norway 91.10 2.72 6.18 100 
Poland 108.59 -5.70 -2.89 100 
United Kingdom 68.81 4.72 26.48 100 
Sweden 120.33 -3.03 -17.31 100 
Turkey 167.01 109.09 -176.10 100 
Simple Average 114.49 -2.15 -12.34 100 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
In general terms, structural change, defined as the shift of workers between 
various activities, not only does not contribute to the increase of the indicator 
but also has a moderately negative impact on the behavior of aggregate labor 
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productivity. Upon examining the data, we find that in nine cases the 
structural effect was negative, while it was only positive and greater than 
10% in six countries with extremely diverse levels of development 
(Denmark, Austria, Ecuador, Japan, Iran and Turkey). Lebanon (-248.2%) 
and Jordan (-48.3%) were also notable cases, where the sectoral 
recomposition of employment significantly hurt industrial performance. The 
above results therefore bring us to one of this work’s objectives, by 
corroborating what other studies have concluded regarding the insignificant 
contribution of structural change to industrial efficiency on the global level 
(Timmer and Szirmai, 2000; Peneder, 2003; Holland and Porcile, 2005).  
 
Table 7 expresses, in percentages, the contribution of the structural effect to 
the evolution of the labor productivity of the sector by activity group. The 
data confirm the low contribution of the worker shift to the performance of 
the aggregate indicator in all countries and for all groups. In only four cases 
did any of the groups have a share of more than 15% of the increase of the 
labor productivity of the sector due to this effect: Holland, where medium-
high and medium-low technology activities contributed 24.8% and 17.6%, 
respectively, to aggregate evolution, Iran, where MH contributed 37%, and 
Japan and Turkey, where the L group participated with 45.2% and 100.4%, 
respectively.  On average, no group of activities had a structural effect that 
represented more than 1% of the increase in the labor efficiency indicator, 
although the figure was on average positive for the H and MH groups and 
negative for the L and ML groups. What held true in both cases was that 
neither of the values was significant.   
 
Table 7 
Contribution of the Structural Effect to the Evolution of Industrial 
Labor Productivity by Groups of Technology Intensity in Selected 
Countries (Percentages) 
 
Country  H MH H+MH ML L Total 
Germany -0.75 -0.71 -1.46 -4.23 -7.10 -13 
Austria -2.38 4.70 2.32 -0.71 12.02 14 
Belgium 3.06 -0.65 2.42 -0.17 5.36 8 
Korea 4.75 -2.47 2.28 -1.73 5.65 6 
Denmark 6.15 0.17 6.33 -0.34 5.06 11 
Ecuador -0.06 10.88 10.82 9.45 -1.79 18 
Slovakia -0.58 -0.78 -1.35 -0.66 0.64 -1 
Spain -0.20 0.27 0.07 -2.24 5.53 3 
United 
States 
-4.35 -2.77 -7.12 1.98 8.97 4 
Finland 7.91 1.40 9.31 -8.59 -12.94 -12 
France -0.72 -1.71 -2.43 -0.65 5.93 3 
Netherlands -11.93 24.77 12.84 17.63 -39.79 -9 
Hungary 4.36 2.16 6.53 -0.92 4.30 10 
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India 1.25 0.93 2.18 1.35 -3.02 1 
Indonesia 0.07 5.04 5.11 -0.23 1.50 6 
Iran 1.93 37.02 38.96 2.69 10.59 52 
Italy -0.26 -2.41 -2.68 -3.38 11.93 6 
Japan -0.40 -13.95 -14.35 -4.33 45.19 27 
Jordan 1.73 -0.54 1.19 -17.21 -32.32 -48 
Latvia 1.44 1.05 2.49 0.34 -1.64 1 
Lebanon -0.07 -60.02 -60.08 -29.31 -158.78 -248 
Morocco 2.71 -3.36 -0.65 -3.24 -1.93 -6 
Mexico 0.21 -1.45 -1.24 -0.74 2.50 1 
Norway 0.29 1.32 1.61 -0.57 1.69 3 
Poland 0.35 -0.29 0.06 -2.86 -2.91 -6 
United 
Kingdom 
-1.33 -0.23 -1.57 0.44 5.85 5 
Sweden 5.10 -0.24 4.87 -5.02 -2.88 -3 
Turkey 2.99 4.26 7.24 1.43 100.41 109 
Simple 
Average 
0.76 0.09 0.85 -1.85 -1.14 -2 
Source: Prepared by the author based on UNIDO (2012) data. 
In that sense, because there was no structural change that drove labor 
productivity in industry, in general terms, it could be said that the 
aforementioned low contribution of technology-intensive activities to the 
behavior of the aggregate indicator is neither associated with nor transmitted 
through a structural transformation that bolsters efficiency levels, regardless 
of the degree of productive development and the weight of the H and MH 
groups in the sector. As such, even though in countries with a greater share of 
high technology-intensive activities (Korea, Hungary and Finland) the 
contribution of the structural effect associated with these activities is slightly 
higher (although still not significant), in traditional production powerhouses 
with a considerable weight for the first two groups (H and MH) (Germany, 
Japan and the United States), the structural effect associated with these 
groups is even negative. 
 
In summary, a greater share of technology-intensive activities in the 
industrial structure does not seem to be associated with either significant 
sectoral gains in labor productivity or with the shift of the labor factor 
towards more efficient uses. These results contradict findings by Cimoli and 
Porcile (2009) and Silva and Teixeira (2011) in terms of the positive and 
significant impact of modern industries on the increase of employment and 
aggregate labor productivity through a process of structural change. 
However, by contrast, they seem to confirm what Peneder (2003) found 
regarding the negative structural effects in his study (insignificant in ours) of 
capital-intensive branches composed of high-technology industries, with 
highly skilled jobs and/or requiring knowledge-based services. 
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It remains then to define whether, in line with Cimoli et al. (2005), the low 
contribution of H and MH activities to aggregate labor productivity is 
explained by the absence of structural change, because technological 
variables act indirectly through transformations to the productive structure, or 
whether, on the contrary, what we observed can be explained by the very 
incapacity of these capital-intensive industries, when they grow, to generate 
the externalities necessary for this transformation. As mentioned already, this 
paper defends a hypothesis that maintains that the simultaneous development 
of complementarities is essential to drive the carry-over effects necessary to 
achieve an authentic process of structural change.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
A variety of theoretical perspectives have defended the relevance of 
structural change that allocates manufacturing factors to higher productivity 
uses in an environment of growing productive specialization. This intuitively 
correct argument has been transferred to the industrial realm, specifically 
pointing to the example of the success of emerging Southeast Asian 
economies. However, the few works dedicated to analyzing structural change 
within industry have found, despite their multiple methodological limitations, 
scarce evidence of the significant contribution of the shift of productive 
factors to the increase in aggregate sectoral productivity in the current 
context of economic globalization. 
 
Likewise, the literature, in addition to indicating that high-technology 
activities have higher levels of efficiency, has generally maintained the 
suitability of industrial upgrading towards a specialization pattern 
concentrated on capital-intensive activities. The strategic role of modern 
sectors in promoting structural change has thus been supported, arguing, 
among other things, that the articulated transformation of the manufacturing 
apparatus occurs automatically through the absorption of products and 
improved processes with higher technological content (Cimoli et al., 2005). 
As a result, various theoretical approaches have pushed for State support of 
high-technology sectors inserted in global chains and usually dedicated to 
exporting products.  
 
However, few studies have consistently proved these assumptions. In this 
regard, the findings of this paper, which used an accounting technique to 
decompose the evolution of labor productivity, indicate that higher-
technology activities do not contribute significantly to aggregate industrial 
labor productivity, regardless of the level of economic and productive 
development of the countries analyzed. In fact, the results overwhelmingly 
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demonstrate that groups that are less technology-intensive had, on average, a 
higher contribution to the increase in the sectoral efficiency indicator.  
 
The exercises conducted here also corroborate, at a high level of 
disaggregation and with a sufficient number of cases, the absence of a 
structural change in industry that would drive levels of aggregate sectoral 
labor productivity. Consequently, there does not seem to be an association 
between the degree of participation of high-technology activities in the 
structure and the performance of the aggregate efficiency indicator or the 
potential shift of workers towards more profitable uses. This could be 
explained by the low capacity of capital-intensive activities to create jobs and 
generate the externalities and carry-over effects necessary for structural 
transformation. Another explanation may be related to what some authors 
have accepted as the challenges in disseminating innovations made at the 
core of industry to the rest of the manufacturing apparatus (David, 1985; 
Arthur, 1989). 
 
Even so, a comprehensive view of productive development would have to 
emphasize the advance of national complementarities, considering a global 
context in which value chains are built and led by major transnational 
companies based on the phenomena of international segmentation and the 
dislocation of the various manufacturing activities. These global orders 
could, in and of themselves, explain the recent lack of development of the 
national complementarities necessary to produce carry-over effects and the 
other pecuniary externalities inherent to substantial structural change that 
would boost aggregate labor productivity. In summary, as Ocampo (2011) 
ascertained, there is currently a detachment between the technology content 
of products (especially export products) and the activities carried out by the 
various countries, where maquila processes are the extreme, as regardless of 
the technology intensity of the product, the tasks performed are strictly 
assembly and are of low domestic added value.  
 
A worldwide context in which the governance of global value chains 
determines the national features of specialization based on tasks and not on 
activities with diverse technology content could then explain why developing 
countries, which have a greater capacity to accumulate capital, have higher 
labor productivity growth rates, but without a significant contribution of the 
structural component, as we might expect, according to Roncolato and 
Kucera (2014). In this regard, the results of this work start to provide a more 
comprehensive overview of what determines aggregate efficiency levels, that 
is, the role of the degree of modernization and systemic efficiency of the 
economy; an idea that should be taken into account to avoid drafting public 
policy measures that support highly technological industries divorced from 
the rest of the manufacturing structure.   
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With that said, some aspects of the theoretical reflections that have received 
less attention are still worthy of notice. For example, Cimoli and Porcile 
(2009) maintain that structural transformation and the consequent increase of 
aggregate labor productivity led by highly technological industries go hand in 
hand with productive diversification. In that sense, and in opposition to the 
current orthodox trend towards over-specialization, the density of the 
manufacturing apparatus is especially important, not only in the development 
of productive complementarities. Because all activities, regardless of their 
intrinsic characteristics, tend to play a rather significant systemic role, one 
final reflection is therefore linked to the criteria to analyze and determine 
relevant public policy, keeping in mind that the ultimate objective of 
productive development should be to promote the welfare of populations.  
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